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THE CURIOUS BEGINNINGS OF THE
CAPITAL GAINS TAX PREFERENCE
Ajay K. Mehrotra* & Julia C. Ott**
Despite the importance of the capital gains tax preference, and the
controversy it often evokes, there has been relatively little serious scholarly
attention paid to the historical development of this highly significant tax
provision. This Article seeks to move beyond the normative and presentist
concerns for or against the tax preference to recount the empirical
beginnings and early twentieth-century development of this important tax
law. In exploring the curious beginnings of the capital gains tax
preference, this brief Article has several aims. First, its main goal is to
show that the preference is not a timeless or transhistorical concept, but
rather a historically contingent one—a concept that has been shaped not
purely by economic logic, but rather by political compromise and social
experience. Second, it uses the capital gains tax preference to shed light on
broader historiographical questions about the rise and fall of different
guiding principles of American political economy. Third, by examining the
shifting political coalitions and constituencies behind the tax preference, it
intends to show that it is not simply wealthy and elite American taxpayers
and their representatives who have supported this tax law. Rather, over
time, the law has had a variety of proponents, suggesting that the
provision’s persistence can be explained as much by political forces and
institutional inertia as by seemingly inexorable economic reasoning.
Ultimately, an exploration of the beginnings and early twentieth-century
development of the capital gains tax preference provides an opportunity to
think about how “we are what we tax.”
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University Maurer School of Law research assistants Rian Dawson, Jayce Born, and Jessie
Laurin. For an overview of the symposium, see Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke &
Linda Sugin, Foreword: We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2413 (2016).
** Associate Professor of History and Director of the Robert L. Heilbroner Center for
Capitalism Studies, The New School for Social Research.
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INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 1921, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of
Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka.1 The Court held that gains
derived from the one-time sale of property constituted taxable income.2
Writing for the Court, Justice John H. Clarke maintained that the legal
definition of taxable income historically had included gains from the sale of
investment property or capital assets, and the recently adopted Sixteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution3 simply ratified that longstanding
interpretation.4
For Clarke, the legal issue was straightforward. “In determining the
definition of the word ‘income’ thus arrived at, this Court has consistently
refused to enter into the refinements of lexicographers or economists and
has approved, in the definitions quoted,” wrote Clark, “what it believed to
be the commonly understood meaning of the term which must have been in
the minds of the people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.”5 By including capital gains in the income tax base, the Court
ensured that wealthy Americans, who owned most of the country’s capital
assets, were paying their fair share of the new income tax.
Although the Court’s decision seemed to settle the constitutional question
of whether capital gains were included in the tax base, determining the tax
rates that applied to such gains remained an open question. Within the
same year, Congress addressed this secondary question. The 1921 Revenue
Act included a provision that taxed capital gains at 12.5 percent, well below
the top marginal rate of 65 percent for ordinary individual income at the
time.6 Thus, the new law created the first preferential rate for capital gains.
Since then, the Internal Revenue Code has almost always contained a
capital gains tax preference in one form or another.7

1. 255 U.S. 509 (1921).
2. Id. at 520–21.
3. “The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
4. Merchants’ Loan & Tr. Co., 255 U.S. at 519.
5. Id.
6. Revenue Act of 1921, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233.
7. To be more precise, the current Internal Revenue Code taxes individual “net longterm capital gain” at a lower rate than “ordinary income” or “net short-term capital gain.”
See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1(h), 1221, 1222 (2012). This preference was
repealed for a short period during the late 1980s as part of the landmark 1986 Tax Reform
Act. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 301, 302, 311, 100 Stat. 2085,
2215–20.
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Given the increasing concerns over rising inequality in the United
States,8 the social implications of the tax code and the preferential treatment
of capital gains recently have captured the attention of many everyday
Americans. In a 2015 Pew Research Center poll, 61 percent of Americans
admit they are “bother[ed] a lot” by the idea that “some wealthy people
fail[] to pay their fair share.”9 Among registered Republicans, 45 percent
admitted they felt the same.10 The recent surge in such sentiments can be
traced to a number of factors including the revelation in 2012 that
Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney’s tax bill totaled only 14.1
percent of his income.11 Romney managed this because he received most
of his income in the form of returns on his investments.12 Romney’s capital
gains were taxed more lightly than his “earned” income received in the
form of salary.
The specific tax treatment of capital gains also has drawn the attention of
both parties’ presidential candidates. Leading Democratic contenders have
challenged the structure of the preference for capital gains. Bernie Sanders
demands the federal government “[t]ax capital gains and dividends the same
as work,” eliminating the preference to achieve equity between “earned”
income from wages and salaries and “unearned” income from capital.13
Hillary Clinton has pledged to “raise” rates on capital gains by stretching
out the amount of time that an individual must hold an investment before
they qualify for the full preferential rate.14 For Clinton, lengthening this
holding period would mitigate against the short-term oriented quarterly
capitalism that she claims has wreaked havoc on the U.S. economy. While
Republicans uphold the preference and call for further cuts in capital gains
taxes, 2016 presidential candidates Donald Trump and Jeb Bush both
identified the carried interest exemption—whereby fund managers may
classify their fees as investment income to qualify for the lower capital
gains tax rate—as a fundamentally unfair loophole that they would close.15
8. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014); Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the
United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q.J. ECON., 1, 1–34 (2003).
9. Federal Tax System Seen in Need of Overhaul, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 19, 2015),
http://www.people-press.org/2015/03/19/federal-tax-system-seen-in-need-of-overhaul/
[https://perma.cc/NDR2-4MWE].
10. Id.
11. Associated Press, Romney’s 2011 Tax Rate 14.1%, Return Shows, NEWSDAY (Sept.
21, 2012, 10:19 PM), http://www.newsday.com/news/nation/romney-s-2011-tax-rate-14-1return-shows-1.4027336 [https://perma.cc/573R-VV5Q].
12. Id.
13. See Ten Fair Ways to Reduce the Deficit and Create Jobs, BERNIE SANDERS: U.S.
SENATOR VT., http://www.sanders.senate.gov/top10 (last visited Apr. 29, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/PGN5-ULK3]; see also JONATHAN TASINI, THE ESSENTIAL BERNIE
SANDERS AND HIS VISION FOR AMERICA 13 (2015).
14. Laura Meckler, Hillary Clinton Proposes Sharp Raise in Some Capital-Gains Tax
Rates, WALL STREET J. (July 24, 2015, 6:56 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/clinton-topropose-rise-in-capital-gains-taxes-on-short-term-investments-1437747732 [https://perma.
cc/4H8D-TBST].
15. See Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 11–15 (2008); Katy Osborn, This Is the Tax Loophole Obama,

2520

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

Why does the federal tax code privilege income from capital gains? How
has this preference persisted for nearly one hundred years through
numerous permutations of federal economic policy and countless changes
to the federal income tax code? Indeed, ever since 1921, when our tax laws
first established the capital gains tax preference, commentators and scholars
alike have analyzed the justifications for this tax preference.16 While some
have decried it as an inefficient and unnecessary benefit for wealthy
taxpayers,17 others have supported it as a much-needed provision to
facilitate the free flow of capital.18
It is not only wealthy taxpayers and their representatives who have
supported this feature of federal income tax law. For nearly one hundred
years, policymakers across the political spectrum have maintained the
preference for capital gains income as a much-needed provision to
encourage and to reward property ownership among everyday citizens. In
addition, organized groups hailing from the financial industries have
doggedly opposed any proposed increase in the capital gains tax rate and
persistently demanded its reduction, even calling for the abolition of any
taxation on capital gains. As early as the 1930s, these groups developed a
new language of “incentives” and “venture capital” and deployed particular
models of how financial markets influence the real economy.19 They
managed to exploit fissures—and in many cases widen them—within both
Bush, and Trump All Want to Close, TIME MONEY (Sept. 16, 2015), http://
time.com/money/4036087/tax-loophole-carried-interest [https://perma.cc/G6JL-B65Q].
16. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes
Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 165 (1994) (“The equitable side of the
capital gains debate reflects not only views on the nature of wealth distribution but on the
nature of America.”); Charles L. B. Lowndes, The Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses
Under the Federal Income Tax, 26 TEX. L. REV. 440, 460 (1948) (“As far as showing ability
to pay an income tax and their economic nature are concerned, there is not the slightest basis
for any distinction between a capital gain and any other form of income.”); Peter Miller, The
“Capital Asset” Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation, 59 YALE L.J. 837, 838
(1950) (“Assuming that the federal income tax should treat like transactions alike, the special
treatment accorded capital gains can be justified only if the transactions giving rise to such
gains have characteristics which set them apart from transactions resulting in ordinary
income.”); Lester B. Snyder, Taxation with an Attitude: Can We Rationalize the Distinction
Between “Earned” and “Unearned” Income?, 18 VA. TAX REV. 241, 244 (1998) (examining
“why we tax income from capital investment differently than income form services,”
including the historical origins of taxing investment and earned income differently).
17. See, e.g., Lowndes, supra note 16, at 440 (“Stripped of the bogus economic theology
which has been cunningly employed to conceal their true origin and character, the capital
gain and loss provisions of the federal income tax are a shrewd and cynical device for
frustrating the progressive principle of the tax and shifting its burden from those best to
those least able to bear it.”).
18. See, e.g., GREGG A. ESENWEIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 98-473-E, INDIVIDUAL
CAPITAL GAINS INCOME: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1998) (concluding that cutting the tax rate
on capital gains income would reduce “lock-in” on capital gain assets); Daniel N. Shaviro,
Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 TAX L. REV. 393, 415 (1993) (concluding that, while there
are some inequalities in the tax preference, “a revenue-raising capital gains tax preference
probably is better than no tax preference. . . . [A] revenue-raising preference probably
increases efficiency”).
19. See, e.g., David Carris, Comment, Capital Gains Taxation: A Full Circle?, 14 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 43, 45 (1989) (citing Morris S. Tremaine, The Capital Gains Tax, 15
TAXES 517, 567 (1937)); see also infra Part II.
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the Republican and Democratic parties. The preference for capital gains,
long embodied in the tax code, thus has been shaped not purely by
economic logic or class bias, but rather by political coalition making and
social experience.
Despite the importance of the capital gains tax preference—and the
controversy it often evokes—there has been relatively little serious
scholarly attention paid to the historical development of this highly
significant tax provision. Besides several studies that have used the origins
of the tax benefit as a preface to an analysis of the existing conventional
justifications for the preference,20 only a few notable scholars have delved
into what the historical origin of this tax law means for the structures of
risk, wealth, and opportunity.21 Building on these latter studies, this Article
seeks to move beyond the normative and presentist concerns for or against
the preference to recount the empirical beginnings and early twentiethcentury development of this important tax law.
In exploring the curious beginnings of the capital gains tax preference,
this brief Article has several aims. First, its main goal is to show that the
preference is not a timeless or transhistorical concept, but rather a
historically contingent one—a concept that has been shaped not purely by
economic logic, but rather by political compromise and social experience.
In fact, chronicling the early history of the tax preference may be one way
to show the historically bounded nature of tax policy. By examining
particular critical junctures in the path-dependent development of the
preference, this Article intends to demonstrate how the preference has
endured because of changing political and social conditions.
A critical history of the ideas and beliefs that undergird existing tax laws
and policies also reminds us that the development of legal and economic
theory is not simply a linear accretion of knowledge. Rather, the theories
that support the capital gains preference are the product of shifting ideas
and beliefs not only about economic growth, but also about the meaning of
risk, wealth, and opportunity in modern American capitalism. This Article
seeks to build upon some of the recent literature on the intellectual history
of the economics discipline and its relationship to American law and
capitalist development to tell a more nuanced and complicated story about

20. For some examples of scholarship on the capital gains tax that has paid only passing,
if any, attention to its history, see Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for
a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319 (1993); Arthur P. Hall, Fifty Years of the
Federal Capital Gains Tax Burden, 67 TAX NOTES 553 (1995); Van Mayhall, Capital Gains
Taxation—The First One Hundred Years, 41 LA. L. REV. 81 (1980); Richard L. Schmalbeck,
The Uneasy Case for a Lower Capital Gains Tax: Why Not the Second Best?, 48 TAX
NOTES 195 (1990).
21. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE CAPITAL GAINS
REDUCTIONS OF 1973, reprinted in THE CAPITAL GAINS CONTROVERSY: A TAX ANALYSTS
READER 219 (J. Andrew Hoerner ed., 1992); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital
Gains Taxation: What’s Law Got to Do With It?, 39 SW. L.J. 869, 917 (1985); Kornhauser,
supra note 16, at 151–54; William D. Popkin, The Deep Structure of Capital Gains, 33 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 153, 154–61 (1983).
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the origins and early development of our current capital gains tax
preference.22
Second, this Article uses the capital gains tax preference to shed light on
broader historiographical questions about the rise and fall of different
guiding principles of American political economy. More specifically, it
seeks to challenge the conventional historical wisdom that Keynesian
economic thinking dominated the post-World War II period only to give
way to the emergence of neoliberalism in the 1970s and afterward. Instead,
this Article claims that elements of both economic theories have been
operating in tandem throughout the twentieth century and that one set of
ideas has been at the forefront during particular historical periods because
of changing political and social context.
Third, by examining the shifting political coalitions and constituencies
behind the tax preference, this Article intends to show that it is not simply
wealthy and elite American taxpayers and their representatives who have
supported this tax law. Rather, over time, the law has had a variety of
proponents, suggesting that the provision’s persistence can be explained as
much by political forces and institutional inertia as by seemingly inexorable
economic reasoning.
In chronicling the curious beginnings of the capital gains tax preference,
this Article analyzes two distinct historical periods. Part I begins with the
formative era of our modern income tax regime to see how the ideas and
actions of economic theorists and lawmakers influenced the adoption of the
preference. The initial impulse behind preferential tax treatment for capital
gains emerged from concerns about stimulating, protecting, and rewarding
property ownership (whether in farms, homes, or financial investments) in
the tumultuous years following World War I. It was during this period that
the preference first became embedded in American tax law.
Part II explores the New Deal Order of the 1930s and 40s, when financial
institutions like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE or “the Exchange”)
began to stress the importance of economic incentives and the need either to
maintain the preference or eliminate capital gains taxation all together.
Faced with rising capital gains tax rates under President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, the NYSE and its academic and corporate allies united with
select southern Democrats to secure the reduction of capital gains taxes in
1938 and 1941. These broader political, social, and institutional forces had
a significant impact on the development of the tax preference.
Finally, this Article concludes with a brief assessment of how our
historical analysis of the first half of the twentieth century can inform our
present understanding of the capital gains tax preference. Indeed, an
exploration of the beginnings and early twentieth-century development of
22. For a sampling of some of this literature, see generally MICHAEL A. BERNSTEIN, A
PERILOUS PROGRESS: ECONOMISTS AND PUBLIC PURPOSE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
(2001); HOWARD BRICK, TRANSCENDING CAPITALISM: VISIONS OF A NEW SOCIETY IN
MODERN AMERICAN THOUGHT (2006); ANGUS BURGIN, THE GREAT PERSUASION:
REINVENTING FREE MARKETS SINCE THE DEPRESSION (2012); PHILIP MIROWSKI, MORE HEAT
THAN LIGHT: ECONOMICS AS SOCIAL PHYSICS, PHYSICS AS NATURE’S ECONOMICS (1989).
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the preference provides an opportunity to think about how “we are what we
tax”—the theme of this law review symposium. This topic allows us to use
a specific legal rule as a point of departure to analyze bigger questions
about the causes and consequences of epistemic shifts and economic
transformations. In contrast to neoclassical economic theory, which
generally assumes that capitalist relations and arrangements are “natural”
and inevitable, a historical approach to the study of American capitalism in
general, and the capital gains tax in particular, questions these assumptions.
It interrogates critically what is frequently presumed to be an inexorable
part of everyday life.23
I. 1920S BEGINNINGS
At the turn of the twentieth century, when the conceptual foundations of
our current income tax system were first being debated, many of the details
of our modern system of direct and progressive taxation were still relatively
uncertain. Although the United States adopted an income tax during the
Civil War and again in 1894, neither of those measures contained a
preference for capital gains.24 In fact, the 1894 tax was quickly struck
down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional in 1895.25 The Court’s
decision triggered a social movement that eventually concluded with the
ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913.26 Thus, when Congress
began considering a new income tax law in that same year, it was operating
with a relatively blank slate. Eventually, the 1913 income tax established
general parameters of relatively high exemption levels and moderately low
rates, but lawmakers were cautious in burdening the new law with too many
complicated distinctions.
Powerful lawmakers counseled that because the 1913 income tax was an
innovation, it was wise to defer until later the creation of distinctions like
differing rates for different types of income. “[L]ike any new tax law,”
Tennessee Congressman Cordell Hull, one of the chief architects of the
income tax, noted, “it will be necessary for the people to become acquainted
with the proposed law and for it to become adjusted to the country before
extending its classifications, abatements, deductions, exemptions, and so
forth.”27
To be sure, some economic theorists and lawmakers had been advocating
for specific classifications of income well before the income tax became
law. Decades earlier, University of Michigan political economist Henry
Carter Adams argued that a truly progressive tax system ought to segregate
23. See Sven Beckert, History of American Capitalism, in AMERICAN HISTORY NOW 314,
315 (Eric Foner & Lisa McGirr eds., 2011).
24. Joseph A. Hill, The Civil War Income Tax, 8 Q.J. ECON. 416, 416 (1894); Charlotte
Twight, Evolution of Federal Income Tax Withholding: The Machinery of Institutional
Change, 14 CATO J. 359, 367 (1994).
25. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583–84 (1895).
26. See JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 22–56 (Robert
E. Burke & Frank Friedel eds., 1985).
27. 50 CONG. REC. 499, 508 (1913) (statement of Rep. Hull).
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income based on its source.28 Adams and others believed that labor income
truly was “earned” from the sweat of the worker’s brow, while income from
capital represented the “unearned” returns from the accumulated wealth of
the idle rich.29 Accordingly, different sources of income ought to be taxed
differently.
In fact, countries like England were already using a schedule-based
income tax that made distinctions between different types of income.30 Yet,
as Congressman Hull explained, the United States was not quite yet ready
for such sophisticated distinctions. “[W]hile the bill should contain the
essential features of a modernized income-tax law,” stated Hull, “no attempt
should be made to write into it the comprehensive system of rates such as is
found in other countries, like England.”31
It did not take long, however, for the country to take on such a
comprehensive system of rates. With the onset of World War I and U.S.
participation in the conflict, marginal income tax rates quickly skyrocketed
and exemption levels declined.32 While the 1913 income tax affected only
about 2 percent of households,33 by 1919 at the height of the war, nearly 20
percent of American households paid income taxes. Meanwhile, World
War I bond drives set in motion an increase in the number of American
households that invested in financial securities.34 As a result, the income
tax and the sale of bonds both became dominant sources of wartime public
revenues, and many more Americans became acquainted with a levy that
was no longer so novel.
Although World War I tax laws introduced many complicated elements
into the tax code, including steeply progressive marginal rates, there was no
preference for capital gains.35 That did not arise until soon after the war.
Faced with a mild post-war recession, and prevailing high marginal rates,
business leaders and economic commentators protested that the elevated
wartime rates were no longer necessary. In fact, many argued that the
wartime legacy of high rates was preventing a return to “normalcy” and
“industrial prosperity.”36 A sharp but short-lived recession and growing
labor and racial unrest compelled political leaders to search for ways to
28. HENRY CARTER ADAMS, THE SCIENCE OF FINANCE: AN INVESTIGATION OF PUBLIC
EXPENDITURES AND PUBLIC REVENUES 332–35 (1899).
29. Id.
30. See Meade Emory, The Early English Income Tax: A Heritage for the
Contemporary, 9 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 286, 295 (1965); A Tax to Beat Napoleon, NAT’L
ARCHIVES:
HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/
http:/www.hmrc.gov.uk/history/taxhis1.htm (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
5T8B-NKZR].
31. See supra note 27.
32. War Revenue Act, § 2, 40 Stat. 300, 301 (1917).
33. AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW,
POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 7 n.14 (2013).
34. JULIA C. OTT, WHEN WALL STREET MET MAIN STREET: THE QUEST FOR AN
INVESTORS’ DEMOCRACY 2 (2011).
35. STEVEN A. BANK, KIRK J. STARK & JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE, WAR AND TAXES 49–82
(2008).
36. 61 CONG. REC. 5135 (1921).
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revive the economy and return the country to a sense of normality.37 It was
in this political and economic context that Congress first began considering
a tax preference for capital gains.
When Congress began drafting and debating the first post-war tax bill,
one of the dominant aims was to find ways to relieve taxpayers of high tax
burdens while stimulating commercial activity. “The reduction of the tax
burdens,” noted the House Ways and Means Committee, “is essential to
business recovery.”38 Some business and political leaders believed that
with the end of the war, the federal government could disband the wartime
tax state and return to a system of more regressive and indirect taxation.
Indeed, some even called for the adoption of a national sales tax to replace
the income tax.39 Other groups, including organized farmers and laborers,
contended that the success of the wartime revenue laws signaled the need to
maintain and perhaps even strengthen the progressive income tax.40 It was
amidst this political contestation that lawmakers forged a compromise:
retain the progressive income tax, albeit at much lower rates, and allow a
preferential tax rate for capital gains.
Many lawmakers and business leaders believed that the high marginal tax
rates were preventing individuals and businesses from selling appreciated
investments. A taxpayer “would refrain from making a sale of land or other
property constituting capital assets because he would have to pay so large a
proportion to the Government,” reported Congressman William R. Green.41
“It would so increase his income taxes that he would not make the sale.”42
Fiscal conservatives, including the then-recently appointed Treasury
Secretary Andrew Mellon, also complained that the high marginal income
tax rates were encouraging wealthy taxpayers to avoid taxes by investing in
tax-free municipal and state bonds.43 These public investments, Mellon and
others argued, starved private enterprise of funds and allowed subnational
governments to indulge in extravagant public projects.44
The specific idea to separate investment gains from ordinary income
seems to have originated with Fredrick R. Kellogg, a leading corporate
lawyer. Testifying before Congress in 1920 and 1921, Kellogg appeared
more the practical expert than the interest-group puppet, more moderate,
more flexible, and, at times, even obsequious compared to the other, rather
37. See Kornhauser, supra note 21, at 871–73.
38. Steven A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Goverance, and Norms, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1159, 1169 (2004) (citing H.R. 350 (1921)).
39. See Excess Profits Tax or Sales Tax?, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1920, at 1,
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9C03E1DB143AEE32A25753C3A96
39C946195D6CF [https://perma.cc/89KS-RE6C]; see also MEHROTRA, supra note 33, at
376–83.
40. See generally ELISABETH S. CLEMENS, THE PEOPLE’S LOBBY: ORGANIZATIONAL
INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1890–1925
(1997); ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN
STATE, 1877–1917 (1999).
41. 61 CONG. REC. 5289 (1921) (statement of Rep. Green).
42. Id.
43. MEHROTRA, supra note 33, at 396–98.
44. Id.
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strident witnesses. In his testimony, Kellogg shifted the subject from
taxpayers to transactions.45 He agreed that high rates yielded less
revenue—a notion that long predates Arthur Laffer’s infamous curve—but
not because the wealthy sheltered their funds. Rather, all Americans
refrained from transacting in the face of high income taxes.46
Kellogg supported his views with anecdotal examples of how numerous
Americans from all walks of life were refraining from taking part in
economically productive transactions because of high tax rates. At the
1921 hearings, legislators swapped stories with Kellogg, stories of
frustrated and beleaguered individual investors: a homeowner who
swallowed a loss when relocation forced him to move; a “thrifty” worker
who might be compelled to sell his “little home” if laid off; a farmer unable
to exit in response to the agricultural crisis because he could not afford the
tax liability; and the stockholder who “would not sell at the top of the
market because of this tax law” and then watched helplessly as share prices
plummeted.47
Frustrated investors could be found in all classes. Aborted transactions
robbed the Treasury of revenue.
Taken together, these forsaken
transactions pointed to a different diagnosis for the postwar recession.
Capital had not been diverted, but “frozen.” In Kellogg’s model, the
relative freedom of capital to flow in a “fluid” fashion in and out of
different enterprises and to assume varied forms determined the state of the
economy.48 “There can be no question, I think, as to the harm,” noted
Kellogg, “during a period of enormous demand for fluid capital for many
reconstruction purposes . . . money [is] enchained in existing forms of
investment.”49 Kellogg’s single capital market held in motion all assets.
In defending his proposal, Kellogg articulated many of the rationales that
defenders of the capital gains preference would repeat down to the present
day. Unless granted a preferential rate, Kellogg claimed, capital gains taxes
unfairly burdened the average property owner, who might realize one large
gain in his lifetime only to see it eaten up by the government when that
windfall bumped him into a higher income tax bracket in the year of sale.50
Income from capital gains also deserved preferential treatment because
inflation reduced the real value of capital gains, even before taxes were
paid.
To counter these potential disincentives, Congress adopted section 206 of
the Revenue Act of 192151 (or “the 1921 Act”)—the first iteration of the
capital gains tax preference. The new provision limited the taxation of “net
capital gains” to 12.5 percent, well below the top marginal rate of 65

45. Internal-Revenue Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance on the Proposed
Revenue Act of 1921, 67th Cong. 534–54 (1921) (statement of Frederick R. Kellogg).
46. Id. at 537–38.
47. Id. at 545–51.
48. Id. at 551.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The Revenue Act of 1921, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233.
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percent on ordinary income.52 Influential leaders in the Treasury
Department and Congress agreed that a lower tax rate on capital gains
would not only unlock the existing impediment taxpayers felt, but would
also potentially increase total tax revenue. The new provision, opined
Congressman Green, “will reduce the rates in many instances which people
will pay on sales of real estate and in some instances on sales of personal
property that are capital assets, but it is quite certain that it will bring about
sales which otherwise would not occur.”53 As a result, Green and others
believed, total revenue would likely increase. “It has been the opinion of all
of the experts of the Treasury,” Green concluded, “that the ultimate
working out of this would bring more revenue into the Treasury.”54
By 1921, the receipt of “unearned” investment income no longer seemed
as plutocratic as it once did. American political culture had long coupled
property ownership and citizenship, but World War I bond drives expanded
the concept of property to encompass financial securities and championed
the ideal of a mass investment society. In contrast with Henry Carter
Adams’s day,55 the receipt of “unearned” investment income no longer
seemed as risk free, given postwar inflation, depression, plummeting stock
prices, and the long-term sectoral shift away from agriculture.
Yet what is perhaps most interesting about the 1921 origins of the capital
gains tax preference is how the present-day justifications for the tax benefit
were also there at its beginnings. Arguments about “unlocking” the free
flow of capital were the dominant rationale, just as they are today.
Likewise, levying a lower rate to compensate for the unfair “bunching” of
income that had occurred over the course of many years was articulated
back in the 1920s and also is used today. Such is the case with claims about
inflation eroding nominal capital gains. And so too is the notion that it is
not only wealthy elites, but all property-owning Americans, who suffer
from high tax rates on the gains from the sale of capital assets.
The 1921 Revenue Act enacted the first capital gains tax preference, but
it was the 1924 law that explicitly revived a distinction between “earned”
and “unearned” income.56 Back in the late nineteenth century, economic
theorists like Henry Carter Adams questioned whether different types of
income ought to be taxed differently. In his pioneering 1898 public finance
treatise, Adams explained why he believed that all sources of income were
not the same: “[T]he difficulty of obtaining the correct statement of
income,” wrote Adams, was aggravated by “the great variety of forms in
which incomes exist.”57 During a simpler age, lawmakers could be more
confident that “incomes [sh]ould be homogeneous” and that a given tax
would lead to “the same treatment applicable to all.”58 But in the more
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 233–37.
61 CONG. REC. 5289 (1921) (statement of Rep. Green).
Id.
See infra notes 56–61 and accompanying text.
Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 246(b)(5), 43 Stat. 253, 291.
See generally ADAMS, supra note 28, at 357.
Id.
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modern age of industrial capitalism, “in society as it exists,” wrote Adams
in 1898, “incomes are not homogeneous. They do not reflect the same
industrial conditions or measure with accuracy the energy expended to
secure them.”59
Adams elaborated on the distinct types of income. A cleavage existed for
him between “[i]ncome from service[s],” by which he meant “wages,
salaries, professional fees,” and “income[] from property,” which included
the returns from capital investments.60 For Adams, each income source was
accompanied by different economic and social conditions and hence
entailed different tax treatment. Because income from services (e.g., wages
and salaries) was “both terminal and uncertain,” while income from
property (e.g., interest, dividends, and capital gains) is “by comparison
considered as perpetual and certain,” the difference warranted “a distinction
in the law of taxation by which income from property is rated higher than
income from effort.”61
Although Adams’s ideas did not initially gain traction as part of the 1913
income tax, it did not take long for some prominent policymakers to take
notice. By the time Congress began considering a new tax bill in 1924, the
economy seemed to be back on track, and Republicans had securely seized
the powers of national lawmaking. This seemed to be an odd time for
lawmakers to consider a tax preference for “earned income.” Yet that is
precisely what occurred. Secretary Mellon, one of the richest men in the
world, began to popularize the idea of a lower tax rate for wages and salary
income—of course, he knew full well that given existing exemption levels,
it was not the everyday worker, but rather elite professionals who would
benefit from such a preference for labor income.
In his highly popular and influential 1921 book, Taxation: The People’s
Business,62 Mellon made the economic case for the tax preference for labor
income. “The fairness of taxing more lightly incomes from wages, salaries
and professional services than the incomes from business or from
investments is beyond question,” wrote Mellon.63 Labor income “is
uncertain and limited in duration; sickness or death destroys it and old age
diminishes it.”64 By contrast, for the capitalist, “the source of income
continues; the income may be disposed of during a man’s life and it
descends to his heirs.”65 Because the tax code already had provided a lower
rate for capital gains, it was only fair, or so the argument was made, that a
tax benefit also be granted to labor income.
Mellon’s calls for an “earned” income tax preference soon became
enacted as part of the 1924 revenue law.66 The first $10,000 of income

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 357–58.
ANDREW W. MELLON, TAXATION: THE PEOPLE’S BUSINESS (1924).
Id. at 56–57.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 209, 43 Stat. 253, 263.
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above exemptions levels was eligible to be categorized as earned income
entitled to the lower tax rate of 12.5 percent.67 Although the legislative
history apparently was not as rich as it was for the 1921 Act and its
adoption of the capital gains preference, economic commentators noted the
significance of the new tax benefit for earned income. Writing in the
American Economic Review, University of Minnesota political economist
Roy Blakey acknowledged that this new tax benefit was a true innovation.68
“Previous federal revenue acts made no differentiation in favor of ‘earned’
income,” wrote Blakey.69
Yet Blakey also underscored that because the income tax as a whole was
still an elite tax that affected only the country’s wealthiest earners, the tax
benefit was rather limited. “Though differentiation in favor or ‘earned’
income is desirable,” wrote Blakey, “it would be much more important if
exemptions were lower.”70 Blakey elaborated on the broader context of the
existing U.S. tax system to illustrate that there were other areas where
differentiation was occurring, including state and local property taxes,
estate and inheritance taxes, and federal excise taxes.71
By the time the 1920s came to a close, the capital gains tax preference
seemed to be securely ensconced in the Internal Revenue Code. Although
there were still several business leaders who wanted to abolish all capital
gains from the income tax base, there were relatively few who believed that
capital gains ought to be taxed at the same rate as ordinary income. Indeed,
if anything, there were some commentators who wanted to tax all sources of
income, including labor income, as little as possible.72
Arguments about the need for capital mobility and fairness seemed to
win the day. The preference was required not only to mitigate against the
“lock-in” effect of holding appreciated investment assets, but also because
the “bunching” of income over time meant that a onetime gain at sale or
disposition exaggerated the tax liability. Equally compelling was the
argument that inflation was overstating the real economic gain that came
from holding and selling capital assets. Thus, from its beginnings, the
capital gains tax preference has been undergirded by a variety of rationales
and justifications—many of which are still made today.73
Yet many of these claims turned on empirical assumptions that were
often difficult to sustain. For example, it was always presumed—without

67. See id.
68. See Roy G. Blakey, The Revenue Act of 1924, 14 AM. ECON. REV. 475 (1924).
69. Id. at 476.
70. Id. at 499.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., EDWIN AMENTA, BOLD RELIEF: INSTITUTIONAL POLITICS AND THE ORIGINS
OF MODERN AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 68 (Ira Katznelson et al. eds., 1998); Roy G. Blakey
& Gladys C. Blakey, Founders and Builders of the Income Tax, 18 TAXES: TAX MAG. 271,
271 (1940); Lawrence Zelenak, Tearing Out the Income Tax by the (Grass)Roots, 15 FLA.
TAX REV. 649, 651 (2014).
73. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 695 (15th ed.
2009); WILLIAM D. POPKIN, INTRODUCTION TO TAXATION § 3.04 (5th ed. 2008); Cunningham
& Schenk, supra note 20.
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much objective evidence—that the lower tax rate on capital gains led to
greater tax revenue from the increased sale of capital assets. Similarly,
business leaders like Kellogg were convinced that the preference could help
all everyday property owners, not just the wealthy who owned most of the
country’s capital assets at the time. Finally, the juxtaposition of a tax
preference for capital gains alongside a somewhat similar benefit for
“earned” or labor income suggested that neither lawmakers nor economic
experts were quite clear about which source of income—capital or labor—
would be more responsive to changing tax rates.
The practical uncertainties did not, however, prevent advocates of the
capital gains tax preference from continuing their support. As the country
faced a new economic crisis in the 1930s, the voices for capital continued to
press the case for a capital gains tax preference. And this time they blamed
the crisis itself on the inability of capital to flow freely. President
Roosevelt and his New Deal responded to the Great Depression in a variety
of ways, including using the tax code as an occasional cudgel against the
rich and wealthy “economic royalists.”74
II. THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL ORDER
When tax receipts plummeted during the Great Depression, Congress
raised rates on top incomes and capital gains. In 1933, Senate hearings led
by the fiery prosecutor Ferdinand Pecora revealed that some of the
wealthiest Americans had avoided paying any income tax by deducting
their capital losses against their ordinary income.75 Among those who
faced Pecora’s wrath, no one was more famous than John Peirpont Morgan,
Jr. Pecora revealed how the losses sustained by Morgan and his partners
due to the market crash wiped out all of their income tax liability in 1931
and 1932.76 Because lawmakers presumed that the rich traded more
frequently, the Revenue Act of 1934 raised rates on capital gains for shortterm investments, along with rates on the highest earned incomes.
Recently routed in its efforts to defeat New Deal securities regulation, the
NYSE—the self-proclaimed “Citadel of Conservatism”—rallied for a new
fight: the elimination of the capital gains tax. NYSE president Richard
74. ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND
WAR 7, 178, 183 (1995); see Revenue Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-377, ch. 815, 50 Stat.
813, 813 (“A[n act t]o provide revenue, equalize taxation, prevent tax evasion and
avoidance, and for other purposes.”); Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-740, § 14, 49
Stat. 1648, 1655 (imposing a new tax on undistributed profits); Revenue Act of 1935, Pub.
L. No. 74-407, § 101, 49 Stat. 1014, 1014 (raising statutory rates and introducing the “wealth
tax”).
75. See Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong. 879 (1933) (statement of J.P. Morgan & Co.) (“In the years 1930,
1931, and 1932 our capital losses (deductible under the law, just as previously the profits had
been added) were such as more than to wipe out our income, and leave nothing taxable.
Income taxes are after all payable upon income and not upon deficits.”); RON CHERNOW, THE
HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE
366 (1990).
76. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong. 879 (statement of J.P. Morgan & Co.).
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Whitney blamed the Great Depression on the very existence of a capital
gains tax. Together with the National Industrial Recovery Act77 and the
National Labor Relations Act,78 capital gains taxes now presented the chief
impediments to economic recovery. Whitney emphatically stated that
recovery must come in the future as it came in the past: through the work
of private enterprises, the intelligence of their management, and the courage
of private capital when it is incentivized by tax preferences.79
Whitney used the word “incentives” in a novel manner. Earlier in the
twentieth century, scientific managers and behavioral psychologists had
used incentive to refer to a prompt or nudge, deliberately designed by an
expert to elicit a desired behavioral response from an individual when the
status quo circumstances—instinct, habit, or even the market—would tend
toward a decision or an outcome that the expert deemed undesirable for that
individual and/or for society at large.80 The meaning of incentive moved
much closer to present-day usage in the Exchange’s challenge to capital
gains taxation. No expert need decide what was best for capital, or the best
use of capital. The notion of “incentives” articulated by NYSE leaders
lacked the coercive or paternalistic aspect of progressives’ usage. Portrayed
as individual investors of modest means, capital voiced its preferred
incentive through NYSE spokesmen—or so they claimed.
Reduction or elimination of capital gains taxes would spur investors to
trade, the NYSE maintained, setting in motion the “circulation” of “frozen”
or “stagnant” capital. This incentive would harness, not circumvent, the
innate American instinct of entrepreneurialism. More trading meant more
investment, more new businesses, more innovation, more and better and
cheaper goods and services, more jobs, more productivity, less inflation,
and more growth. Ultimately, the Exchange spokesmen promised, the
Treasury would collect more revenue from the larger economy.81
More gains for the investor meant more revenue for the government. But
“incentives” insinuated something more than just an even exchange.
“Incentives” now hinted at variable, potentially unlimited upsides for all
parties, similar to its neoliberal usage (think stock-based compensation a.k.a
“incentive pay”). The characterization of capital gains tax reductions as
something like a Pareto-optimal trade disguised the policy’s likely effects:
the upward redistribution of wealth, the enhancement of the economic
freedom for some, and the concealment of structural constraints
experienced by others.

77. Pub. L. No. 67-73, § 1, 48 Stat. 195, 195 (1933).
78. See generally National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 1, 49
Stat. 449, 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012)).
79. Richard Whitney, NYSE President, Address at the 53rd Annual Dinner of the
Engineers’ Society of Western Pennsylvania: Elements of Recovery 285 (Feb. 26, 1935) (on
file with the NYSE archives).
80. See RUTH W. GRANT, STRINGS ATTACHED: UNTANGLING THE ETHICS OF INCENTIVES
17–18 (2012).
81. Schram for Revision of Capital Gains Tax; Says It Tends to Depress Stock
Quotations, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1941, at 38.
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The NYSE’s decades-long campaign against capital gains taxes forged a
new meaning for “incentive”—a model of human motivation much closer
to the one with which we live today. The Exchange reconciled “incentives”
with “markets,” as in present neoliberal usage, where incentives prompt
individuals to enter markets to secure optimal outcomes for themselves and
for society at large (think the 401(k) match). The new meaning of
“incentives” would provide the core principle for supply-side marginal tax
cuts.82 “Incentives” spilled out of the arena of tax policy into debates over
social policy, environmental policy, educational policy, and more.83 Today
incentives appear everywhere as an obvious, noncoercive method for
eliciting desired behaviors.84
As we have seen, the Exchange integrated its demand for the reduction or
removal of capital gains taxes into a broader rejection of the still-evolving
tenets of the New Deal. The Exchange reasserted its pro-investment theory
of political economy, which dated back to Woodrow Wilson’s election.
The Exchange’s ideology of “shareholder democracy” included three core
tenets85: First, broad-based share ownership reconciled democracy and
industrial capitalism.
Second, shareholders’ interests warranted
prioritization by lawmakers and by corporate managers. Third, economic
resources and risk were best distributed when securitized (i.e., turned into
stocks and bonds) and traded on privately administered markets,
unhampered by taxation or state-based regulation.86
The double-dip “Roosevelt Recession” that hit in 1937 prodded new
audiences to entertain the NYSE’s pro-investment theories and its tax
policy recommendations. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce and economist
Irving Fisher took up the cause of capital gains tax and the language of
incentives. Invitations poured into Exchange leaders’ offices from a wide
range of business associations, particularly ones located in the South and
West. NYSE president Charles Gay warned them that stimulating
consumers’ income ahead of productive facilities—as proto-Keynesians
close to the President had advised—would not produce or maintain
prosperity.87 Instead, enterprises needed new and enlarged “productive
That would require businesses to raise “new
facilities.”88
capital . . . through the issuance of stock and bonds.”89 And that, in turn,
required the NYSE to maintain “a continuously liquid security market,”

82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., RICHARD B. MCKENZIE & DWIGHT R. LEE, MANAGING THROUGH
INCENTIVES: HOW TO DEVELOP A MORE COLLABORATIVE, PRODUCTIVE, AND PROFITABLE
ORGANIZATION, at viii (1998) (“Incentives do more than provide worker drive, however.
When they become part and parcel of the firm’s policy structure, they are also an important
means of communicating the firm’s mission and most valued goals and objectives.”).
85. OTT, supra note 34, at 216.
86. Id.
87. Charles Gay, Capital Markets and Business Recovery, Address at the Illinois
Manufacturers’ Association (Apr. 27, 1937) (on file with the NYSE archives).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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which it could not do until the “deadening hand” of capital gains taxation
released its grasp.90
In Congress, some southern Democrats came to the table with northern
Republicans to listen more closely to opponents of the capital gains tax. In
November 1937, the House Ways and Means Committee took up a bill to
abolish taxes on capital gains. President Roosevelt threatened a veto.91
“Desirable as it is to foster business recovery,” the President scolded, “we
should not do so by creating injustices in the tax system, particularly
injustices at the expense of the man who earns his income—injustices to the
advantage of the man who does not.”92 Senator Vanderberg (R-MI)
responded, “I shall not yield to the President’s demand for a tax on thrift
and prudence, which is at least partially responsible for today’s chaos. I
prefer the route which leads to recovery as chartered by Senate Democrats
and Republicans alike,”93 i.e., the abolition of capital gains taxes
recommended by the NYSE. Vanderberg and coauthor Senator Josiah W.
Bailey (D-NC) released their “Conservative Manifesto” a mere month
later.94 Business organizations, including NYSE brokerages, circulated two
million copies. The reduction of capital gains taxes stood at the top of their
list of demands.
With the Revenue Act of 1938,95 the tax code’s preference for unearned
income actually increased in the midst of the Great Depression. In the
decades that followed, both the NYSE and southern Democrats pushed for
further capital gains tax relief (in 1953, for example, Congressman Hale
Boggs introduced a capital gains tax reduction bill named “the Revenue
Incentives Act”96). The top maximum rate of taxation on capital gains
bottomed out in 1942 at 25 percent—where it would remain until 1967
(efforts were made to reduce it even further)—even as taxes on ordinary
(earned) income rose to 91 percent for the top bracket.97 Remarkably, the
capital gains preference widened during a period marked by rising real
wages and diminishing inequality.
90. Id.
91. See Roosevelt Asks Profits Tax Be Retained in Bill, SARASOTA HERALD, Apr. 14,
1938, at 1 [hereinafter HERALD], https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1787&dat=
19380414&id=pyAhAAAAIBAJ&sjid=hmQEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5467,1121839&hl=en
[https://perma.cc/9WUD-Q8BG]; see also H.R. 8471, 75th Cong. (2d Sess. 1937).
92. HERALD, supra note 91, at 2.
93. Roosevelt Letter on Profits and Gains Taxes Irks Congress, WALL STREET J., Apr.
14, 1938, at 14.
94. See John Robert Moore, Senator Josiah W. Bailey and the “Conservative
Manifesto” of 1937, 31 J. S. HIST. 21, 32 (1965). The New York Times published the full text
of the Manifesto the day after syndicated columnists Joseph Alsop and Robert E. Kintner
published isolated portions of it. See Turner Catledge, 10 Points Drafted: Attempt Made to
Unite All Conservatives and Moderates on Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1937, at 1.
95. See generally Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-554, § 1, 52 Stat. 447.
96. Revenue Incentives Act of 1953, H.R. 3686, 83d Cong. (1st sess. 1953).
97. See Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 150, 56 Stat. 798, 843 (establishing
a 25 percent capital gains tax rate). See generally Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-814,
64 Stat. 906; CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE, TOP FEDERAL INCOME TAX RATES SINCE 1913
(2011), http://www.ctj.org/pdf/regcg.pdf (describing federal rates since 1913) [https://
perma.cc/L2EP-CD2K].
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World War II sparked fierce debate over federal taxation. Congress
transformed the income tax into a mass tax and raised marginal rates on
earned—or what we would call today, ordinary—income. But the Revenue
Act of 194298 (introduced by Rep. Patrick Boland, D-PA) simultaneously
lowered taxes on capital gains in an effort to encourage private capital to
invest in economic activity that could support the war effort. Lawmakers
adopted the logic of the NYSE, expressed here by President Emil Schram,
the former Chairman of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation:
[L]owering of the capital gains tax will free equity capital, and by so
doing will not only help to shift a portion of the financing of the defense
effort from government to private capital but also to increase the revenue
derived from the capital gains tax itself.99

At the time, rates destroyed incentives and rendered “venture capital
impotent,”100 Schram surmised, introducing another neoliberal keyword
into American political discourse. Testifying in favor of the Boland bill,
leaders of the American Taxpayer’s Association and the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce echoed Schram’s sentiments and adopted the Exchange’s
language of incentives, diminishing returns, and venture capital.101
The nation’s need to maximize production for an unprecedented global
war gave rise to new experiments in government ownership of plant and
infrastructure, much to the distress of many business and financial leaders.
War bond speeches delivered and broadcast by NYSE representatives
stressed the importance of preserving “our American way of life, which
revolves around the system of initiative and enterprise” after the war.102
Most alarming was the significance of the socialist trend represented by the
$10 billion of property used for war production that was operated by private
corporations but owned by the federal government through the Defense
Plant Corporation103 (DPC).
NYSE president Emil Schram articulated a postwar economic
reconversion plan that included the privatization of all DPC facilities, as
well as steep tax reductions. Taken together, the two reforms would
provide private enterprise with the required incentives to ramp up both
production and employment, rendering full employment legislation

98. See generally Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798.
99. Schram Asks Cut in Capital Gain Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1942, at 1.
100. Text of Emil Schram’s Statement on Capital Gains Before Senate Group, WALL
STREET J., Aug. 8, 1942, at 3.
101. Statement of Emil Schram Before the Ways and Means Committee (Mar. 20, 1942)
(on file with NYSE archives).
102. Emil Schram, President, N.Y. Stock Exch., America’s Ability to Bear War Debt:
Preserve Our System of Private Enterprise, Address Before the Nashville, Tenn., Chamber of
Commerce (Apr. 13, 1942), http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/1942-04-13b.html
[https://perma.cc/S43D-8DC7].
103. Emil Schram, Address at the San Francisco Chamber of Commerce: Postwar
Horizons (1943) (on file with the NYSE archives); Emil Schram, Informal Off-the-Record
Remarks at the Connecticut Newcomen Dinner (June 9, 1943) (on file with the NYSE
archives); Emil Schram, Untitled Speeches (1943) (on file with the NYSE archives).
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unnecessary.104 Stumping for southern Democrats like Texas Congressman
Hatton Summers—who led opposition to President Roosevelt’s plan to
“pack” the Supreme Court back in 1937—Schram sought to educate the
audience on the capital gain tax’s destructive effects on venture capital.105
Schram also advised against the prospect of new taxes to support social
programs, warning that Americans were learning to depend too much on
Washington.106
Launching an institutional advertising campaign in 1946, the NYSE
sought to educate the public on the key “requirements” for postwar
economic reconversion and recovery. The Exchange understood the
ongoing battle to preserve—and even expand—the capital gains preference
as just one front in its larger war against the “regimented form of security”
that was introduced by the New Deal and that threatened to extend its reach
after the war.107
CONCLUSION
By the end of World War II, the capital gains tax preference had become
an entrenched part of the Internal Revenue Code. Although the detailed
mechanics of the provision continued to change throughout the century,
with the preference even disappearing for a short time in the late 1980s, the
concept of taxing gains from the sale of capital assets at a lower rate seemed
to have become a natural and accepted part of U.S. tax law. Consequently,
the preference has taken on an air of economic determinacy and logical
inevitability.
The persistence and durability of the capital gains tax preference,
however, is not the result of any inexorable or transhistorical logic. Rather,
the origins and early development of the preference are rooted in changing
social, political, and economic contexts. Adopted soon after World War I,
when marginal tax rates were at historic highs, the preference initially was
justified as a necessary incentive for the free flow of capital and as a fair
way to tax gains that had accumulated over time.
Still, even then, economic experts and policymakers were not convinced
that investment returns were the only type of income responsive to
changing tax rates. For soon after the preference was enacted, Congress
also created a lower tax rate for labor income. The simultaneous existence
of these two tax preferences suggests that there is hardly anything natural,
104. Emil Schram, Lunch Address Before the Advertising Club of Baltimore (July 11,
1945) (on file with the NYSE archives); see also Godfrey N. Nelson, Eccles’ Proposal for
Tax Discussed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1945, at 5(1).
105. Emil Schram, Address at the Annual Dinner of the Houston, TX Chamber of
Commerce (Dec. 18, 1946) [hereinafter Schram, Annual Dinner Speech] (on file with the
NYSE archives); see also Former NYSE Chairman of the Board Robert P. Boylan’s
Endorsement for Senator Robert L. Doughton (D-GA), Remarks Before a Joint Meeting of
the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce and the Association of Stock Exchange Firms (Feb. 13,
1948) (on file with the NYSE archives).
106. See Schram, Annual Dinner Speech, supra note 105.
107. Emil Schram, Address Before the Rotary Club of Tampa (Feb. 5, 1946) (on file with
the NYSE archives).
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neutral, or necessary about the capital gains tax preference. Indeed, the
enactment of a tax preference for labor income, however fleeting, suggests
a fiscal path not taken—one that illuminates the contingency of current
policy and the possibilities for variation and reform.
A critical history of the capital gains tax preference also demonstrates
how economic and political elites have framed the supposedly widespread
benefits of the preference. Using a new idiom of “incentives” and “venture
capital,” economic leaders in the 1930s depicted the capital gains tax
preference as something that is available and enjoyed by all property
owners across the socioeconomic spectrum, when empirically it was the
wealthy elite who owned most of the country’s capital assets. Similarly,
lawmakers and policy analysts also deployed the language and logic of
neoclassical economics to suggest the potential long-term benefits of tax
cuts. Many advocates of the capital gains tax preference have contended
that lower tax rates on capital gains would always and everywhere lead to
increased tax revenue, even though there was little objective, empirical
evidence to support that theory.
Ultimately, this story about the origins and early development of the
capital gains tax preference is intended to provide a historical glimpse at tax
law and policy that often is analyzed in ahistorical terms. For a symposium
focused on “we are what we tax,” an examination of the curious beginnings
of the capital gains tax preference can teach us a great deal about how a
seemingly innocuous tax provision—one that frequently has been assumed
to be an organic and preordained part of our tax code—reflects changing
conceptions of risk, wealth, and opportunity in the United States.

